simontsui, to random

Hot off the press! CISA adds CVE-2023-43770 (6.1 medium) Roundcube Webmail Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.
๐Ÿ”— (to be replaced later) https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

#CISA #KEV #KnownExploitedVulnerabilitiesCatalog #vulnerability #eitw #Roundcube #XSS #activeexploitation #CVE_2023_43770

simontsui,

Why you should care about CVE-2023-43770:
ESET Research previously reported on 25 October 2023 that the Winter Vivern APT was exploiting a similar RoundCube cross-site scripting vulnerability CVE-2023-5631 as a zero-day against European overnmental entities and a think tank.

#CISA #KEV #KnownExploitedVulnerabilitiesCatalog #vulnerability #eitw #Roundcube #XSS #activeexploitation #CVE_2023_43770 #WinterVivern #APT #cyberespionage

simontsui, to Cybersecurity

CISA, on behalf of the collective group of industry and government partners that comprise the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), released JCDCโ€™s 2024 Priorities. Similar to the 2023 JCDC Planning Agenda, JCDCโ€™s 2024 Priorities will help focus the collective group on developing high-impact and collaborative solutions to the most pressing cybersecurity challenges.

๐Ÿ”— https://www.cisa.gov/topics/partnerships-and-collaboration/joint-cyber-defense-collaborative/2024-jcdc-priorities

simontsui, to random

Check Point highlights the persistent threat of malicious Word/Excel Documents (maldocs):

  • Old Vulnerabilities Still Pose Risks: Despite being several years old, CVEs from 2017 and 2018 in Microsoft Word and Excel remain active threats in the cybersecurity landscape. Examples include CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, and CVE-2018-0802.
  • Widespread Use by Cybercriminals: These vulnerabilities are exploited by well-known malware such as GuLoader, Agent Tesla, Formbook, and others. APT groups also got on the list, with Gamaredon APT being a notable example. They target lucrative sectors like finance, government, and healthcare, indicating a strategic approach by attackers.
  • Challenges in Detection: Despite their age, these MalDocs can evade detection due to their sophisticated construction and the use of various tricks to bypass security measures.

๐Ÿ”— https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/maldocs-in-word-and-excel-a-persistent-cybersecurity-challenge/

H3liumb0y, to China

๐Ÿšจ Cybersecurity Alert: Unveiling COATHANGER Malware ๐Ÿšจ

A recent advisory from the Dutch & has exposed a new threat lurking within appliances: the malware, a remote access trojan (RAT) that's as elusive as it is persistent. Here are the highlights taken from their released TLP-CLEAR advisory:

  • Incident response uncovered previously unpublished malware, a remote access trojan (RAT) designed specifically for Fortigate appliances.
  • refer to the malware as COATHANGER based on a string present in the code.
  • It hides itself by hooking system calls that could reveal its presence.
  • It survives reboots and firmware upgrades. Even fully patched FortiGate devices may therefore be infected, if they were compromised before the latest patch was applied.
  • high confidence that the malicious activity was conducted by a statesponsored actor from the Peopleโ€™s Republic of China
  • The Chinese threat actor(s) scan for vulnerable edge devices at scale and gain access opportunistically, and likely introduce COATHANGER as a communication channel for select victims.
  • initial access occurred through exploitation of the CVE-2022-42475 vulnerability
  • Although this incident started with abuse of CVE-2022- 42475, the COATHANGER malware could conceivably be used in combination with any present or future software vulnerability in FortiGate devices.
  • MIVD & AIVD refer to this RAT as COATHANGER. The name is derived from the peculiar phrase that the malware uses to encrypt the configuration on disk: โ€˜She took his coat and hung it upโ€™.
  • Please note that second-stage malware like COATHANGER are used in tandem with a vulnerability: the malware is used for persistence to a victim network after the actor gained access.
  • The implant connects back periodically to a Command & Control server over SSL, providing a BusyBox reverse shell.
  • It hides itself by hooking most system calls that could reveal its presence, such as stat and opendir. It does so by replacing them for any process that is forced to load preload.so.
  • Section 3.2 of the PDF has a detailed description of how COATHANGER malware behaves and interacts.
  • Communication to the C2 server is done over a TLS tunnel. COATHANGER first sends the following request to the HTTP GET request to the C2 server: GET / HTTP/2nHost: www.google.comnn

The COATHANGER malware drops the following files;

/bin/smartctl or /data/bin/smartctl<br></br>/data2/.bd.key/authd<br></br>/data2/.bd.key/httpsd<br></br>/data2/.bd.key/newcli<br></br>/data2/.bd.key/preload.so<br></br>/data2/.bd.key/sh<br></br>/lib/liblog.so<br></br>

Several methods have been identified to detect COATHANGER implants. A script was released by them for automated detection HERE These include a YARA-rule, a JA3-hash, different CLI commands, file checksums and a network traffic heuristic.

  • Two YARA rules are provided for detection on the COATHANGER samples.
  • The COATHANGER implant communicates to the C2 server using TLS. This TLS connection is fingerprintable using the following JA3-hash: 339f6adf54e6076d069dcaac54fddc25

With access to the CLI of a FortiGate device, the presence of COATHANGER can be detected in three ways.

  1. Check if the files /bin/smartctl or /data/bin/smartctl exist and inspect the timestamps of smartctl and other files in the same directory. If smartctl was modified later than the majority of other files or is not a symlink, it is likely that the smartctl binary was tampered with.

Use the following command:

fnsysctl ls -la /bin<br></br>fnsysctl ls -la /data/bin<br></br>
  1. The following command shows a list of active TCP sockets. Whenever the FortiGate device has internet access and the malware is active, the outgoing connection will appear in the results. Check the reputation of all outgoing contection IP's.diagnose sys tcpsock

The specific version of COATHANGER that this report describes uses the process name 'httpsd' to obfuscate itself. Therefore, any suspicious outgoing connections to external IP addresses from a process called httpsd is a strong indicator of the presence of COATHANGER:

<device_IP>:<device_port>-><c2_IP>:<c2_port>-<br></br>>state=established err=0 socktype=1 rma=0 wma=0<br></br>fma=0 tma=0 inode=<inode> process=<PID>/httpsd<br></br>
  1. The specific version of COATHANGER that this report describes uses the process name httpsd to obfuscate itself. All active processes can be listed using the following command:fnsysctl ps

Running the following command returns all PID's named 'httpsd'

diagnose sys process pidof httpsd<br></br>

Using the retrieved process IDs from the previous command yields process information for the processes named httpsd.

diagnose sys process dump <PID><br></br>

When the process has a GID set to 90, the device is infected with COATHANGER.

simontsui, to random

Cloudflare blog on Thanksgiving 2023 security incident:

"Based on our collaboration with colleagues in the industry and government, we believe that this attack was performed by a nation state attacker with the goal of obtaining persistent and widespread access to Cloudflareโ€™s global network."

The attack started in October with the compromise of Okta, but the threat actor only began targeting our systems using those credentials from the Okta compromise in mid-November.
๐Ÿ”— https://blog.cloudflare.com/thanksgiving-2023-security-incident

ketmorco, to streaming
@ketmorco@fosstodon.org avatar

Hey friends! After a long hiatus, I'm starting again - as mentioned in an earlier post, I'm going to be figuring out how to create / repos. I've done some very simple in the past, and may do some work on that, too. We'll see what we can get done in the time I'll be spending.

https://www.twitch.tv/wayneswonderarium

(boosts welcome)

InfobloxThreatIntel, to Cybersecurity

Almost a year ago we discovered DNS malware Decoy Dog and went on a wild ride chasing that down. In August, we did a deep dive webinar on the malware and how we analyzed it. No pay/sign wall! #dns #malware #infoblox #threatintel #cybersecurity #infosec #apt #decoydog https://www.infoblox.com/resources/webinars/decoy-dog-is-no-ordinary-pupy-separating-a-sly-dns-malware-from-the-pack/

YourAnonRiots, to microsoft Japanese
@YourAnonRiots@mstdn.social avatar

๐Ÿ” #Microsoft discloses Russian #APT infiltrated its systems through a test account, stealing emails and attachments of senior executives and others in #cybersecurity and legal departments.

https://thehackernews.com/2024/01/microsofts-top-execs-emails-breached-in.html

#hacking

securityaffairs, to Russia Italian
simontsui, to microsoft

Since November 2023, Microsoft has observed a distinct subset of Mint Sandstorm (PHOSPHORUS) targeting high-profile individuals working on Middle Eastern affairs at universities and research organizations in Belgium, France, Gaza, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In this campaign, Mint Sandstorm used bespoke phishing lures in an attempt to socially engineer targets into downloading malicious files. In a handful of cases, Microsoft observed new post-intrusion tradecraft including the use of a new, custom backdoor called MediaPl.
๐Ÿ”— https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/

jos1264, to news
@jos1264@social.skynetcloud.site avatar
smxi, to fedora
@smxi@fosstodon.org avatar

More / CPU issues, it looks like / have changed a default standard path in /sys for unknown reasons, thus breaking inxi cpu speed collection. This tripped need to do more refactors, this time to the fake cpu data debugger logic, it was not complete.

Also, a new codeberg issue pointed out that in many I can get basic RAM/RAM array data from udevadm, which appears to dump some dmi data into itself, available to user.

Still tracking down root causes.

smxi,
@smxi@fosstodon.org avatar

@adamw @mjgardner again, I was literally just last month testing distro ID for official fedora spins, and had to install modules to do it. So whatever sources you have are not reflected in material reality that we can all particpate in. Thanks for proving my choice of #debian has been right for the last 18 years. And #apt.

julianferdinand, to random

We just published our annual adversary #infrastructure report for 2023, which provides an in-depth analysis of infrastructure belonging to the most prevalent #malware families we track, analyses the impact of infrastructure takedowns (e.g., Qakbot), and discusses #APT infrastructure trends, among others: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2024-1209.pdf

SI_FalconTeam, to infosec German

#100DaysofYARA

Today: Hunting for a code signing certificate issued to "D2innovation Co.,LTD"

Malicious use of this certificate have been attributed to #Kimsuky #APT by @asdasd13asbz (https://twitter.com/asdasd13asbz/status/1744279858778456325)

We currently can't confirm whether this is a stolen certificate, an impersonation or a shell/front corporation. The website for "d2innovation[.]jp" has been inactive/HTTP403 since early 2023 according to the Internet Archive.

So far we have found five samples signed with this certificate. The earliest compilation timestamps go back to the 13th of December 2023. One sample has a header timestamp set to 0 (1970-01-01). Using a cutoff date in the rule might limit hunting results.

Some samples are already available on @abuse_ch Malware Bazaar. We'll share the missing ones in a minute.

#IOC
27ef6917fe32685fdf9b755eb8e97565
88f183304b99c897aacfa321d58e1840
87429e9223d45e0359cd1c41c0301836
7b6d02a459fdaa4caa1a5bf741c4bd42
7457dc037c4a5f3713d9243a0dfb1a2c

Samples can be found here: https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse.php?search=serial_number:8890cab1cd510cd20dab4ce5948cbc3a

#infosec #cybersecurity

still, to random

has anyone noticed the mysterious DNS tunneling associated with tons of subdomains on *.ignorelist.com, claudfront.net, *.allowlisted.net?

been seeing it across many IPs associated with various Chinese #APT

YourAnonRiots, to Cybersecurity Japanese
@YourAnonRiots@mstdn.social avatar

๐Ÿšจ Tactical overlaps discovered between #APT Sandman and China-based threat cluster using KEYPLUG backdoor.

https://thehackernews.com/2023/12/researchers-unmask-sandman-apts-hidden.html

#cybersecurity #informationsecurity

wokerati, to random

FSB targets the UK (again). There's no way this isn't cahoots.

#StarBlizzard #APT #ProudBear #DemocraticInterference

avolha, to infosec Polish

Polskie DKWOC we wspรณล‚pracy z Microsoftem ukrรณciล‚o nowฤ… kampaniฤ™ grupy Forest Blizzard, identyfikowanej teลผ jako APT28 czy Fancy Bear i ล‚ฤ…czonej z rosyjskimi sล‚uลผbami

https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/woc/articles/aktualnosci-w/wykrywanie-atakow-na-serwery-pocztowe-microsoft-exchange/

(byล‚a o tym prezentacja na OMH, niestety "live only", wiฤ™c nagranie nie bฤ™dzie dostฤ™pne)

#infosec #cyberbezpieczenstwo #APT

avolha,

The Polish Cyber Command (DKWOC) partnered with Microsoft to take action against a Russian-based nation-state threat actor tracked as Forest Blizzard (also known as APT28 and Fancy Bear)

https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/woc/articles/aktualnosci-w/detecting-malicious-activity-against-microsoft-exchange-servers/ [ENG]

#infosec #security #APT

simontsui, to random

Kaspersky details a malicious loader variant that targets macOS. Kaspersky assumes this is Bluenoroff, the North Korean state-sponsored APT. IOC included.
๐Ÿ”— https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-new-macos-malware/111290/

#BlueNoroff #APT #NorthKorea #cybercrime #IOC #threatintel

AlexandraB, to Cybersecurity Dutch
@AlexandraB@mastodon.social avatar
securityaffairs, to Korea Italian
br00t4c, to random
@br00t4c@mastodon.social avatar
YourAnonRiots, to Cybersecurity Japanese
@YourAnonRiots@mstdn.social avatar

New: Hamas-Linked Group Revives SysJoker Malware, Leverages OneDrive to Hit Targets in Israel.

https://hackread.com/hamas-group-sysjoker-malware-leverages-onedrive/

0x58, to Cybersecurity

๐Ÿ“จ Latest issue of my curated #cybersecurity and #infosec list of resources for week #47/2023 is out! It includes the following and much more:

โž ๐Ÿ”“ ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง University of Manchester #CISO Speaks Out on Summer Cyber-Attack
โž ๐Ÿ”“ ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ Hacktivists breach U.S. nuclear research lab, steal employee data
โž ๐Ÿ”“ ๐Ÿ‘€ Sumo Logic Completes Investigation Into Recent Security #Breach
โž ๐Ÿ”“ ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ Auto parts giant AutoZone warns of #MOVEit data breach
โž ๐Ÿ”“ ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ฆ Canadian government discloses data breach after contractor hacks
โž ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ซ New 'HrServ.dll' Web Shell Detected in #APT Attack Targeting Afghan Government
โž ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง ๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ท UK and South Korea: Hackers use zero-day in supply-chain attack
โž ๐Ÿ‡ต๐Ÿ‡ธ ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฑ #Hamas-Linked #Cyberattacks Using Rust-Powered SysJoker #Backdoor Against #Israel
โž ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ ๐Ÿ˜ฑ โ€œThey are tired of him, but they are afraidโ€: what is known about the leader of the hacker group Killnet
โž ๐Ÿ‡ฐ๐Ÿ‡ต N. Korean Hackers Distribute Trojanized #CyberLink Software in Supply Chain Attack
โž โ–ถ๏ธ ๐Ÿ›’ Play #Ransomware Goes Commercial - Now Offered as a Service to Cybercriminals
โž ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ณ Indian Hack-for-Hire Group Targeted U.S., #China, and More for Over 10 Years
โž ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russian hackers use #Ngrok feature and #WinRAR exploit to attack embassies
โž ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ ๐Ÿฉบ #CISA Releases Cybersecurity Guidance for #Healthcare, Public Health Organizations
โž ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง ๐Ÿ™๐Ÿป Thanking the vulnerability research community with #NCSC Challenge Coins
โž ๐Ÿง… #Tor Network Removes Risky Relays Associated With #Cryptocurrency Scheme
โž ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ ๐Ÿ‘‹๐Ÿป #Ukraine fires top cybersecurity officials
โž ๐Ÿฉน Johnson Controls Patches Critical #Vulnerability in Industrial Refrigeration Products
โž ๐Ÿฆ  ๐Ÿฆ€ New WailingCrab #Malware Loader Spreading via Shipping-Themed Emails
โž ๐Ÿฆ  ๐Ÿ“จ New Agent Tesla Malware Variant Using ZPAQ Compression in Email Attacks
โž ๐Ÿฆ  ๐ŸŽ  NetSupport #RAT Infections on the Rise - Targeting Government and Business Sectors
โž ๐Ÿšซ Google #Chrome will limit ad blockers starting June 2024
โž ๐Ÿ› โ˜๏ธ 3 Critical Vulnerabilities Expose #ownCloud Users to Data Breaches
โž ๐Ÿ”“ โ˜๏ธ Researchers Discover Dangerous Exposure of Sensitive #Kubernetes Secrets
โž ๐Ÿ”“ โ˜๐Ÿป New Flaws in Fingerprint Sensors Let Attackers Bypass #Windows Hello Login
โž ๐Ÿ”“ ๐Ÿฉธ โ€˜#CitrixBleedโ€™ vulnerability targeted by nation-state and criminal hackers: CISA
โž ๐Ÿก Researchers extract RSA keys from #SSH server signing errors

๐Ÿ“š This week's recommended reading is: "How I Rob Banks: And Other Such Places" by FC a.k.a. Freakyclown

Subscribe to the #infosecMASHUP newsletter to have it piping hot in your inbox every week-end โฌ‡๏ธ

https://infosec-mashup.santolaria.net/p/infosec-mashup-week-472023

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